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Abstract  
 
This paper discusses a medical practitioner’s right to conscientiously object to 
providing a legally available healthcare service in New Zealand, on the grounds of 
their personal beliefs. Currently, the right to conscientiously object is enshrined in the 
Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Act 2003 and the Contraception, 
Sterilisation and Abortion Act. This paper argues the current legislative arrangement 
regulating a health practitioner’s right to conscientiously object under New Zealand 
law is vague, and risks cementing uncertainty, due to scope of the protection being 
unclear. In addition, the current protection risks patient safety, as it does not exclude 
the right to conscientiously object in medical emergencies, or when the efficacy of the 
treatment is time dependent. To remedy this unsatisfactory situation, it is 
recommended that the right to conscientiously object in healthcare be rendered 
impermissible in the aforementioned scenarios. It is further recommended that direct 
referral to a non-objecting colleague be mandatory in the event a practitioner wishes 
to exercise their right to conscientiously object. This is because access to healthcare 
may be compromised by a practitioner exercising the right to conscientiously object, 
with no corresponding direct referral requirement, a risk borne by patients.    
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The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes, appendix and 
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I  Introduction 
 
On 14 July 2013, the Marlborough Express reported Dr Joseph Lee’s refusal to renew 
Melissa Pont’s prescription for the oral contraceptive pill.1 Dr Lee’s refusal, coupled 
with his later statements that he believed women have a “reproductive duty”2 to bear 
children, ignited a controversy about conscientious objection in healthcare. 
Conscientious objection in healthcare details the situation where a medical 
practitioner (usually a nurse, doctor or pharmacist) refuses to provide a legally 
available treatment to a patient requesting it on account of their ethical, moral or 
religious beliefs. Conscientious objection in healthcare creates a conflict between a 
patient’s right to access legally available healthcare services, and a practitioner’s right 
to refuse to provide services that conflict with their fundamental beliefs.  
 
Conscientious objection in healthcare, therefore, raises the following legal and ethical 
questions:   
(a) Should a medical practitioner have the right to conscientiously object to 
providing a treatment if it conflicts with their moral, ethical or religious 
beliefs?  
(b) Does this answer change in the event of a medical emergency, or where the 
efficacy of the treatment is time dependent?  
(c) Should New Zealand law continue to permit conscientious objection, and, if 
so, to what extent?  
This paper seeks to answer these questions, by addressing the theory behind 
conscientious objection in healthcare.  
  
The analysis will predominantly centre on an area of healthcare where conscientious 
objection is most commonly permissible – reproductive health. This is where most of 
the existing case law and academic commentary has arisen from. Conscientious 
objection, however, is potentially much broader than this, encompassing other 
controversial medical treatments such as euthanasia. In addition, evolving medical 
developments, such as invitro fertilization and ‘designer babies’ may raise questions 
of conscience beyond the traditional bounds in which the right to conscientiously 
object has been exercised in the past.3 Science and technology may also create further 
fields where the right to conscientiously object is desirable.  
 
                                                            
1 Marlborough Express “GP Refuses Women Contraceptive Pill” Stuff (online ed, Wellington, 14 July 
2013).  
2 Cherie Howie “Women have Reproductive Duty, says ‘Rhythm Doctor’” The New Zealand Herald 
(online ed, Auckland, 14 July 2013).   
3 Mark Wicclair Conscientious Objection in Health Care (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2011) at 21. 
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This paper will address how other jurisdictions have accommodated the right to 
conscientiously object in healthcare, before considering New Zealand law. In 
particular, legislation and case law from the United States, the United Kingdom and 
Europe will be examined as a guide.  
 
Presently under New Zealand law, a practitioner’s right of conscientious objection is 
protected by both section 46 of the Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion Act 
1977 (CSA) and section 174 of the Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Act 
2003 (HPCA). Working in tandem with these sections, are guidelines promulgated by 
organisations such as the Office of the Health and Disability Commissioner and the 
New Zealand Medical Council.4  
 
A better legislative framework for the exercise of conscientious objection in 
healthcare is required for New Zealand. This paper contends that the current 
protection is vague, and risks creating legal disputes. More alarmingly, it risks 
cementing uncertainties about what is the permissible extent of a practitioner’s legally 
protected right to conscientiously object to providing a healthcare service. 
Consequently, robust legislation regulating the extent of a medical practitioner’s right 
to conscientiously object is necessary for the purposes of clarifying the law, 
preventing further disputes from arising and ensuring an appropriate balance between 
the competing rights.  
 
It is problematic that the current legislative framework reinforces a hierarchy of 
beliefs, by protecting the right to conscientious objection in a single area of healthcare 
– reproductive health.5 Legislative protection of conscientious objection should either 
be abandoned in its entirety, or expanded to encompass secular conscientious 
objections that are equally worthy of protection, to provide consistency.  
 
In addition, it is recommended that direct referral to a non-objecting colleague be 
mandatory and conscientious objection be impermissible in the case of a medical 
emergency. The reasons for the recommendations are that access to healthcare must 
assume primacy in any discussion of the appropriate balance to be struck between the 
competing interests, and the right to conscientiously object risks compounding access 
issues for those from rural areas, the poor, or the uneducated. 
                                                            
4 See: Office of the Health and Disability Commissioner The Code of Rights (2004) 
<www.hdc.org.nz>; and Medical Council of New Zealand Good Medical Practice (Medical Council of 
New Zealand, April 2013).   
5 See: Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion Act, s 46; and Health Practitioners Competence 
Assurance Act 2003, s 174.  
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II Theory    
A   Conscience  
 
Philosophical notions of conscience provide important background context to 
conscientious objection in healthcare. By understanding of the nature of conscience, 
one is better placed to answer the question of precisely what it is internationally 
recognised conscientious objection legislation seeks to protect. Conscience is broadly 
understood as an internal sense of guidance, or morality, as to what is right or wrong.6 
Conscience is identifiable as a core, rather than ancillary, set of moral or ethical 
beliefs.7 Generally, these beliefs do not change greatly over time, if at all.8  Implicit 
within many understandings of conscience is the idea that conscience is an 
individual’s mechanism for passing judgement on their own action or inactions.9 Peter 
Fuss summarises conscience as “a disposition to act in accordance with one’s own 
ethical beliefs and corresponding emotional responses [emphasis added].” 10  This 
sentence highlights an important aspect of the failure to adhere to conscience: 
subsequent emotional impact, or what Mark Wicclair refers to as “moral distress.”11 
To define conscience, it is important to focus “on the relationship between a course of 
action and one’s own ethical convictions.”12  Conscience is, therefore, personal in 
terms of both origin and impact. External influences, however, often play a role in 
shaping conscience, for example, religious precepts.  
  
Conscience is extraordinarily difficult to regulate. This fact is especially problematic 
in the medical field. Conscience almost always involves inherently personal 
questions. Some theorists have asserted that conscience is simply an internal version 
of what environmental and cultural factors have led us to believe is right.13 For this 
reason, as Armand Antommaria explains, interpreting conscience on the basis of an 
internal morality alone “has difficulty accounting for the putative self-sufficiency of 
claims of conscience.”14 On this basis, definitions of conscience should also give rise 
to a consideration of what Antommaria terms “social norms.”15 These provide a more 
robust basis for determining when the law might wish to protect someone exercising 
their right to freedom of conscience. Focussing on both the personal aspect of 
                                                            
6Kimberly Moss “Do No Harm – Unless She Wants an Abortion or Birth Control: The Conscience 
Movement’s Impact of Women’s Health” (2010) 19 Texas Journal of Women and the Law 173 at 173.  
3 
8Wicclair, above n 3,at 5.  
9Wicclair, above n 3, at 3.  
10Peter Fuss, cited by Mark Wicclair, above n 3,at 3.  
11At 9.  
12Armand Antonmaria “Conscientious Objection in Clinical Practice: Notice, Informed Consent, 
Referral and Emergency Treatment” (2011) 9 Ave Maria Law Review 81 at 83.  
13Wicclair, above n 3, at 2.  
14At 83. 
15At 83. 
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conscience and wider societal norms has the twin advantage of avoiding, to a certain 
extent, the creation of a hierarchy of moral beliefs while giving recognition to the 
uniqueness of the doctor/patient relationship.  
 
In summation, conscience is an important part of an individual’s internal belief 
system. Acting contrary to conscience may have adverse short and long-term mental 
effects, including harming the practitioner’s sense of self-worth.16 Conscience alone, 
however, cannot be both the beginning and the end of the question of whether legal 
protection is necessary. Conscience has often proved itself historically suspect as a 
method of judgement.17 For this reason, legislative attempts to encapsulate a cohesive 
protection of conscience must account for both its inherent individuality and its 
relationship with broader societal norms. The preceding comments provide an 
important background to considering whether the current protection of conscientious 
objection in New Zealand – existing only in the field of reproductive of healthcare – 
should be extended beyond this. This question will be considered in part eight of this 
paper.  
B   Conscientious objection in healthcare  
 
Conscientious objection in healthcare describes the situation where a health 
practitioner refuses to provide a patient a legally available treatment on the grounds of 
conscience. As Mark Wicclair explains:18  
 
In the context of health care, physicians, nurses and pharmacists engage in acts of 
conscientious objection when they (1) refuse to provide legal and professionally 
accepted goods and services that fall within the scope of their professional 
competence, and (2) justify their refusal by claiming it was an act of conscience. 
 
Conscientious objection is most well-known within the field of reproductive health 
services. While in practice religious beliefs are often the root cause of many 
practitioners’ conscientious objection, the right is not, in theory, this limited. The 
controversy surrounding euthanasia also prompts conscientious objection to be 
exercised by a large subset of the medical community.19  
 
                                                            
16Wicclair, above n 3, at 25 -27. 
17Wicclair, above n 3, at 27. 
18At 1.  
19See the discussion on Oregon legalising physician assisted suicide in Mark Wicclair, above n 3, at 20-
21. 
8 
 
 
 
In this regard, it is worthwhile noting that Maryan Street’s End of Life Choice Bill 
was recently withdrawn from the Member’s Bill Ballot.20 As a result, while this paper 
will primarily discuss conscientious objection through the lens of reproductive health 
services, conscientious objection may encompass other areas of healthcare, such as 
euthanasia.   
 
Conscientious objection has historically been viewed favourably in the context of a 
compulsory draft.21 It is perhaps less understood in the context of healthcare, where, 
in the midst of a fiduciary relationship between doctor and patient, personal, ethical or 
religious values are perceived to have a lesser status. Conscientious objection is 
particularly problematic in the field of healthcare as medical practitioners enjoy a 
monopoly over the provision of medical treatment.22  
 
Two trends have contributed to the rise of conscientious objection in healthcare; 
firstly the relative liberalisation of abortion and secondly, an increasing assertiveness 
on behalf of patients, marking, to an unquantifiable extent, the end of the ‘doctor 
knows best’ paternalistic attitude. 23  Patients are more willing to challenge their 
doctors with regard to proposed treatments, resulting in medical practitioners being 
pressured into courses of action they might personally disagreeable.24    
 
The right of conscientious objection is aimed at protecting practitioners, rather than 
practitioners imposing their beliefs on a patient.25  As Armand Antonmaria notes, 
“claims of conscience should fundamentally be understood as claims of personal 
integrity.” 26  In this regard, conscientious objection should be considered as an 
objection to the particular treatment in question, rather than the class of patient. As 
Mark Wicclair notes, “if a refusal is based on the nature of the good or service, rather 
than on the characteristics of patients it is not likely to involve invidious 
discrimination.” 27 This framing could become problematic, however, when the 
availability of the treatment in question is so limited that a refusal by one practitioner 
                                                            
20End of Life Choice Bill 2012 (50). At the time of writing, the Bill had just been withdrawn from the 
members ballot on the 26 September 2013 after concerns it would “become an election year football if 
drawn” see: Hamish Rutherford “Voluntary Euthanasia Bill Withdrawn” Stuff (online ed, Wellington, 
26 September 2013). 
21Julie Canter and Ken Baum “The Limits of Conscientious Objection – May Pharmacists Refuse to 
Fill Prescriptions for Emergency Contraception?”(2004) 351 New Eng J Med 2008 at 2008; Wicclair, 
above n 3, at 13.  
22T A Cavanaugh “Professional Conscientious Objection in Medicine with Attention to Referral” 
(2011) 9 Ave Maria Law Review 189 at 196.   
23Bernard Dickens “Conscientious Objection: Shield or a Sword” in Sheila McLean (ed) First Do No 
Harm: Ethics and Healthcare (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot 2006)337 at 339.   
24Dickens, above n 23, at 338.   
25Antonmaria, above n 12, at 84.  
26At 82.  
27At 209.  
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may effectively result in the imposition of a practitioner’s morality or values on a 
patient. Assuming, however, that the disputed service is readily (and easily) available 
elsewhere, conscientious objection should not be construed as a medical practitioner 
imposing their beliefs on a patient.   
 
Conscientious objection encompasses, but goes beyond a refusal on the grounds of 
morality alone. Wicclair has attempted to demarcate the difference between not 
dissimilar refusals to treat, by defining conscientious based refusals as occurring:28  
 
If and only when (1) the agent has a core set of moral (i.e. ethical or religious) 
beliefs; (2) providing the good or service is incompatible with the agent’s core moral 
beliefs; and (3) the agent’s refusal is based on her core beliefs.  
 
These criteria are better understood with a practical example. Wicclair uses the 
example of a medical practitioner refusing to provide “aggressive, life sustaining 
treatment to a patient who is not intended to survive to discharge.”29 The refusal in 
this case involves a moral reluctance to unduly subject a patient to unnecessary 
treatment, however, insofar as the treatment sought by family members does not 
contravene the practitioner’s core moral beliefs, the practitioner’s refusal to provide it 
is not a conscientious objection.30 
C Moral Complicity and Referral  
 
Practitioners faced with a patient who wishes to receive a healthcare service they 
conscientiously object to providing cannot simply remove themselves from the 
situation. A further element of the academic discussion, therefore, comprises 
arguments about moral complicity and agency.31 These arguments are important when 
addressing an objecting practitioner’s obligation to refer a patient seeking a disputed 
treatment to a colleague who will provide it.  
 
Those opposed to a referral requirement have argued that a practitioner exercising 
their right to conscientious objection will feel equally morally complicit in referring a 
patient to a colleague to perform the disputed service, as they would having 
performed it themselves.32 Under this view, a referral requirement is akin to saying, “I 
can’t kill you, but the guy down the road can.”33 Based on this logic, any legislative 
                                                            
28At 5.  
29At 8. 
30 Wicclair, above n 3, at 6.  
31See for example: Wicclair, above n 3, at 36.  
32Wicclair, above n 3, at 37 
33Holly Fernandez Lynch Conflicts of Conscience in Healthcare: An Institutional Compromise 
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Massachusetts, 2008) at 231; Wicclair, above n 3, at 38.    
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protection of conscientious objection that imposes a direct referral requirement 
effectively offers very little conscience protection for practitioners.   
 
It is important at this point to distinguish between direct and indirect referral, as 
differing levels of moral complicity arise from each.34 Direct referral is where the 
practitioner exercising their right to conscientiously object communicates, as 
indicated, directly, with a colleague to assure that the patient receives the treatment in 
question.35  For example, in the case of abortion, an objecting practitioner would 
contact a colleague in person to transfer the case, thereby ensuring the women in 
question was under the care of a colleague willing to perform the procedure. Indirect 
referral, on the other hand, is limited to simply informing the patient that they can 
receive the disputed treatment elsewhere.36  For example, in the case of a patient 
seeking contraceptives, by stating that Family Planning offers the contraceptives 
sought.  
 
Direct referral is typically understood as involving higher levels of moral 
complicity.37 Frank Chervenak and Laurence McCullough have argued that while “it 
might be plausible to ascribe moral complicity in relation to direct referral,”38  a 
practitioner: 39 
 
 … cannot reasonably be understood to be a party to, or complicit in, a subsequent 
decision that is the sole province of the patient’s subsequent exercise of autonomy in 
consultation with a referral physician. 
  
This view was also alluded to by the Inner House of the Scottish Court of Session in 
Doogan v National Health Services Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board 
(Doogan),40 where the midwives in question “did not accept that they could avoid 
moral responsibility for a task by asking others to carry it out.”41 These might seem 
philosophically fine distinctions to draw. In practice, however, it makes intuitive 
sense that directly facilitating access to a treatment to which one is opposed would 
cause practitioners increased moral distress, when compared with the mere act of 
informing the patient that this treatment could be sought elsewhere.  
 
                                                            
34Wicclair, above n 3, at 38.  
35Wicclair, above n 3, at 37.  
36Wicclair, above n 3, at 37.  
37Wicclair, above n 3, at 37. 
38Frank Chervenak and Laurence McCullough, quoted in Wicclair, above n 3, at 37. 
39Frank Chervenak and Laurence McCullough, quoted in Wicclair, above n 3, at 37.  
40Doogan v NHS Greater Glasgow & Clyde Health Board [2013] CSIH 36.  
41Doogan v NHS Greater Glasgow & Clyde Health Board, above n 40, at [13]. 
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The preceding discussion introduces some of the reasons why referral requirements 
continue to be one of the most difficult areas of conscientious objection legislation. 
This will be discussed further in part eight of this paper, where options for a reform of 
New Zealand’s conscientious objection legislation are discussed, including mandatory 
direct referral. The questions a referral requirement raises are not easily resolvable. 
Answering them may be narrowed down to a question of whether it is more important 
to protect practitioners’ consciences, or whether ensuring access to legally available 
treatments should take preference. This begs the question of whether the right to 
conscientiously object in healthcare is something the law should wish to protect in the 
first place.  
III   Should the right to conscientiously object be protected?  
A  Academic Views  
 
Academics have struggled to provide a theoretical basis for discussing conscientious 
objection in the medical field.42 Mark Wicclair has remedied this with his recent work 
on conscientious objection in healthcare.43 This section will discuss Wicclair’s two 
contrasting theories, conscious absolutism and the incompatibility thesis, which 
encapsulate the bulk of the arguments for and against the right of conscientious 
objection.44  
1 Conscience absolutism  
 
The first of Wicclair’s theories is termed “conscious absolutism.” 45  This theory 
maintains that a medical practitioner should never be forced to do any action 
professionally that compromises his or her conscience, including referring a patient.46 
Supporters of conscience absolutism argue it is harmful for practitioners to provide a 
treatment that goes against their conscience.47 As Wicclair explains “acting contrary 
to core moral beliefs is perceived by the agent as an act of self-betrayal.”48 On this 
basis, supporters of conscious absolutism assert that a person forced to perform an 
action contrary to their conscience could suffer adverse mental health effects as a 
result of feeling that their integrity has been compromised.49 At the very least, a 
                                                            
42See for example: Michael E Duffy “Good Medicine: Why Pharmacists Should Be Prescribed a Right 
of Conscience” (2010) 44 Valparaiso University Law Review 509. 
43Wicclair, above n 3.  
44 Wicclair, above n 3, at 34-37 and 44-46.  
45Wicclair, above n 3, at 34.  
46Wicclair, above n 3, at 34.   
47See Armand Antonmaria, above n 12, at 83.  
48Wicclair, above n 3, at 5.  
49Wicclair, above n 3, at 26. 
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person might feel belittled, humiliated or suffer from a sense of decreased self-worth 
on account of their actions. These are not desirable outcomes.  
 
Conscious absolutism has found some support within the next generation of the 
medical profession.50  In a study published by the Journal of Medical Ethics, 42.5% of 
the medical students surveyed agreed with the statement “doctors should be entitled to 
object to any procedure for which they have moral, cultural or religious 
disagreement.” 51  These results raise questions about whether, if no right to 
conscientiously object in healthcare existed, potentially valuable members of the 
profession would be excluded.  
 
The importance of having a diverse range of practitioners with different moral, ethical 
and religious beliefs should not be understated. Disallowing practitioners the 
opportunity to exercise a right to conscientiously object risks this diversity.52 This is 
likely to most affect those with religious beliefs.53 Excluding religious people from 
the medical profession, aside from being problematic from a human rights 
perspective, could be considered bad for patients, as a diverse and thriving medical 
profession is a desirable goal. The American Medical Student Association has 
recently stated that “having a diverse physician workforce is a critical component in 
making healthcare available to those who need it the most.”54 Accordingly, promoting 
a plurality of beliefs in the medical sector is a worthwhile endeavour.   
 
It may also be unwise to exclude those with strong moral, ethical or religious beliefs 
entering into healthcare.55 Medicine should not be bereft of personal morality.56 Some 
assert that personal moral and ethical guidelines are, in fact, an essential part of a 
practitioner’s skillset, which are not severable.57 As Charles Hepler notes “we would 
be naïve to expect a pharmacists to forsake his or her ethics in one area … while 
applying them for the patient’s welfare in every other area.”58  Capitalising on a 
practitioner’s morality to care for patients, while excluding their personal morality in 
other areas, appears to be an odd trade off. Proponents of the right of practitioners to 
                                                            
50Sydney Morning Herald “Next Generation of Doctors Vote on Right to Refuse Treatment” Sydney 
Morning Herald (online ed, Sydney, 19 July 2011).   
51Sydney Morning Herald, above n 50.  
52Wicclair, above n 3, at 30.  
53 See: Edmund D Pelligrino “The Physician’s Conscience, Conscience Clauses and Religious Beliefs: 
A Catholic Perspective” (2002) 30 Fordham Urban Law Journal 221 at 242. 
54 American Medical Student Association “Enriching Medicine Through Diversity” American Medical 
Student Association <www.amsa.org>.  
55Some reasons for this are discussed by Maya Noronha “Removing Conscience from Medicine: 
Turning the Hippocratic Oath into a Hypocrite’s Pledge” (2010) 23 The Georgetown Journal of Legal 
Ethics 733 at 737.  
56Lynch, above n 33, at 8.  
57Chales Hepler, quoted in: Wicclair, above n 3, at 27. 
58Chales Hepler, quoted in: Wicclair, above n 3, at 27. 
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conscientiously object argue that the practice of medicine would be impossible 
without these moral or ethical guidelines, on account of the discretionary decision-
making, involving a consideration of complex moral and ethical issues.59  
 
A related concern is the risk of encountering difficulties if a practitioner’s personal 
moral judgement is excluded from medicine. Practitioners will always encounter 
moral dilemmas in the course of their work, and when these occur, they should be 
entrusted to rely upon their moral compass to determine the best course of action for 
their patients. These arguments are flawed insofar as that they assume a practitioner’s 
conscience provides a sufficient compass for solving these kinds of dilemmas, 
superior to that of professional ethical standards. Personal ethical standards may be 
less reliable than professional ones. As Wicclair notes, “depending on the content of a 
person’s core moral beliefs, maintaining moral integrity can require invidious 
discrimination, genocide, cruelty, and so forth.”60 This ultimately leads back to the 
conundrum of conscience: its inherent individuality, and correspondingly, the difficult 
task of formulating a conception of conscience protection that is capable of 
accommodating vastly disparate beliefs. Those opposed to conscientious objection 
submit these problems as reasons for excluding conscientious objection from the 
practice of medicine.  
2 Incompatibility thesis  
 
At the opposite side of the continuum, Wicclair’s “incompatibility thesis”61 states that 
if a practitioner is unwilling to provide any legally available treatment, simply put, 
they should not become a doctor.62 The fiduciary duty a practitioner owes to patients 
provides a compelling reason for excluding conscientious objection from healthcare.63 
The nature of a fiduciary duty suggests that a practitioner is obliged to place their 
patients’ interests ahead of their own in the event of a conflict. This view is outlined 
by Kimberly Moss, who writes that “doctors have fiduciary duties to their patients to 
act in good faith to protect their health, particularly to the extent that the patient’s 
interest conflicts with the physician’s self-interest.”64  
 
While a practitioner’s fiduciary duty is undoubtedly important, it is already subject to 
limits. Practitioners will not work tirelessly at all hours, nor should we expect them to 
abandon their holidays or personal time for a patient in need. 65  In this regard, 
                                                            
59Wicclair, above n 3,at 26. 
60Wicclair, above n 3, at 27. 
61Wicclair, above n 3, at 43. 
62Wicclair, above n 3, at 33.  
63Kimberly Moss, above n 6, at 179.  
64At 179.   
65Lynch, above n 33, at 44-45.   
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practicalities dictate that they will not always put their patients ahead of themselves, 
nor can a medical practitioner’s fiduciary duty provide a complete answer to the 
vexed question of whether conscientious objection in healthcare should be 
permissible.  
 
Critics of the right to conscientiously object further argue that a practitioner’s 
professional obligations should prevent them from refusing to provide legally 
available treatments.66 Julian Savulescu, a renowned medical ethicist, puts forward 
the following scenario: 67 
 
Imagine an epidemic of bird flu or other infectious disease that a specialist decided 
she valued her own life more than her duty to treat her patients. Such a set of values 
would be incompatible with being a doctor. 
 
Savulescu uses this example to indicate that conscientious objection could become a 
shield for doctors who do not want to treat patients for reasons of self-preservation.68 
This argument could be taken further, as the exercise of conscientious objection could 
become a backdoor way of permitting discriminatory practices, allowing doctors to 
refuse to treat patients whose perceived lifestyles or beliefs they did not agree with.   
 
Allowing some form of conscientious objection inevitably creates staffing problems, 
in the form of administrators having to work around any number of objecting 
practitioners. A corresponding point is that any increase in workloads as a result of 
conscientious objection will be borne by other practitioners who do not object. This 
may create a sense of ill-will on behalf of practitioners who are forced to perform 
additional tasks. This inefficiency dictates against permitting conscientious objection 
in healthcare.  
 
Healthcare is already extraordinarily expensive, whether publically or privately 
funded. Figures released by the New Zealand Treasury project the cost of healthcare 
rising from 6.8% of gross domestic product in 2010, to 10.8% in 2060.69  Hospitals 
are always pressed for resources, and medical practitioners already suffer under 
strenuous workloads. Working around conscientiously objecting practitioners may 
increase the cost of healthcare as a whole, as hospitals are forced to hire more staff 
members who do not conscientiously object.70 More empirical evidence is necessary 
                                                            
66Julian Savulescu “Conscientious Objection in Medicine” (2006) 332 British Medical Journal 294 at 
295. 
67At 295; see also Wicclair, above n 3, at 59-60.   
68At 295.   
69The Treasury Affording Our Future: Statement on New Zealand’s Long-Term Fiscal Position (July 
2013) at 4.   
70 See the argument in Doogan, above n 40, at [27]. 
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before any conclusions can be drawn. The right of conscientious objection however, 
remains an important public interest consideration. 
3 Specialties  
 
There is a middle ground between the polarising concepts of conscious absolutism 
and the incompatibility thesis. This middle ground proposes that if the disputed 
treatment forms an integral part of the particular specialty the objecting practitioner 
wishes to partake in, they should not become a member of that speciality.71 Judicially, 
this approach was alluded to by the Outer House in the Scottish Court of Session, 
where Lady Smith reasoned that “nurses and midwives should give careful 
consideration when deciding whether or not to accept employment in an area that 
carries out treatment or procedures to which they object”, in response to a claim of 
statutory conscientious objection protection.72 
 
This approach seems a valid compromise, in that it allows objecting practitioners to 
continue the practice of medicine, without their objections becoming an undue 
hindrance on employers or access to legally available treatments.  However, it is not 
without problems. For example, a practitioner may wish to enter the gynaecology 
field, because of a strong interest in the aspects of the speciality, yet be strongly 
opposed to providing abortions. Under this middle ground, she would be forbidden to 
do so. There would always be issues at the margins, as it will never be entirely clear 
whether a disputed treatment forms an essential part of the specialty, rendering it 
difficult to legislate. To summarise, no academic theory provides a comprehensive 
answer to the whether conscientious objection in healthcare should ultimately be 
permissible.   
IV Competing Human Rights  
A International Conventions 
 
Turning to international human rights conventions provides little help in determining 
how the issues surrounding conscientious objection might be satisfactorily resolved. 
There is support for both positions in international conventions. New Zealand is a 
party to international instruments regulating both the right to receive adequate 
medical treatment and the right to religious freedom.73 On one hand, article 18 of the 
                                                            
71Wicclair, above n 3, at 82-83.  
72Doogan v NHS Greater Glasgow & Clyde Health Board [2012] CSOH 32 at [15].  
73See: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171 (opened for signature 16 
December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976); Universal Declaration of Human Rights GA Res 
217A (III) A/80 (1948); and United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees that “everyone has the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion,” 74  a hallmark right in democratic 
societies.75 On the other hand, article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights states parties must “recognize the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.”76   
 
Because conscientious objection is currently exercised in the context of reproductive 
health services, it is worthwhile considering human rights legislation aimed at 
women. Article 12(1) of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”) states that parties should “ensure on 
a basis of equality of men and women, access to health care services, including those 
related to family planning.”77 As New Zealand is a party to CEDAW, it is important 
to ensure that legislation regulating reproductive health does not unduly impact on 
women’s equal access to healthcare. The CEDAW Committee, in its last report, raised 
concerns about New Zealand’s abortion law.78   
B Pichon and Sajous v France 
 
Recently, the European Court of Human Rights had the opportunity to consider 
conscientious objection in healthcare in Pichon and Sajous v France. 79 Two 
pharmacists were prosecuted under the French Consumer Code for refusing to supply 
contraceptives. 80 The pharmacists argued that the conviction infringed their article 9 
rights (freedom of thought, conscience and religion)81 under the European Convention 
on Human Rights.82 The Court rejected this.83 Mark Campbell has cautioned against 
interpreting this judgment as an authority for article 9 providing no protection for the 
right to conscientiously object in healthcare.84 Campbell suggests two reasons for 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Discrimination against Women 1249 UNTS 13(opened for signature 18 December 1979, entered into 
force 3 September 1981). 
74Universal Declaration of Human Rights GA Res 217A (III) A/80 (1948), art 18.  
75 Mark Campbell “Conscientious Objection, Health Care and Article 9 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights” (2011) 11 Med L Int 284 at 286.  
76International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 993 UNTS 171 (opened for 
signature 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 19), art 12.  
77United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 1249 
UNTS 13(opened for signature 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981), art 12(1). 
78Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women Concluding 
Observations on New Zealand (27 July 2012).  
79Pichon and Sajous v France (49853/99) Section III, ECHR 2 October 2001.  
80Pichon and Sajous v France, above n 79, at 1.   
81Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (The European 
Convention) 213 UNTS 222 (opened for signature 4 November 1950, entered into force 21 September 
1970), art 9.  
82Pichon and Sajous v France , above n 79, at 2.   
83At 4.   
84At 288-289.  
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this.85 Firstly Pichon concerned admissibility and did not consider the merits, and 
secondly, the case involved a criminal law prosecution.86 As Campbell explains “the 
approach of the Court has been that criminal laws of general application do not 
usually amount to an interference with article 9 rights.” 87  Campbell concludes, 
therefore, that Pichon should not be read “as laying out a definitive Strasbourg 
position on conscientious objection and article 9.”88 The judgment does, however, 
indicate reluctance on the part of the Court to assert that article 9 protects the right to 
conscientiously object within the medical field.  
C Doogan v NHS Greater Glasgow and Clive  
 
Similarly, in the United Kingdom, the Doogan89 decision gave short shrift to article 9 
in the context of the right to conscientiously object in healthcare.90 Lady Smith, in the 
Outer House of the Scottish Court of Session, began by noting that, while the right to 
hold beliefs was not subject to limits, the right to manifest them was qualified.91 Her 
Honour reasoned that because article 9 rights were already essentially qualified by a 
specific conscientious objection provision in the United Kingdom Abortion Act 
1967,92 it was unnecessary to undertake the balancing exercise Article 9 required.93 
The plaintiffs’ Article 9 argument appears to have been abandoned on the appeal to 
the Inner House.94 Both cases will be discussed in part five.  
 
As the preceding section indicates, conscientious objection in healthcare raises valid 
competing policy concerns. There are strong academic arguments and important 
human rights implications on both sides of the divide. The moral distress objecting 
practitioners may feel if forced to undertake medical treatments, which fly in the face 
of their deeply held moral, religious or ethical beliefs is worth considering. On this 
basis, conscientious objection in healthcare is prima facie worth protecting. The right 
of patients to access legally available medical treatments, however, must take 
precedence if an appropriate compromise cannot be reached. Accordingly, any 
legislative reform of conscientious objection must ensure that if the right remains 
protected, it is not at the expense of legal treatments being readily available in a 
                                                            
85At 289.  
86At 289. 
87At 289. 
88At 290.  
89Doogan, above n 72.  
90Doogan, above n 72, At [72].  
91At [48]; see Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (The 
European Convention) 213 UNTS 222 (opened for signature 4 November 1950, entered into force 21 
September 1970), art 9(2).  
92Abortion Act 1967 (UK), s 4(1).  
93At [80].    
94See: Doogan, above n 40.  
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timely manner, without the creation of barriers by objecting practitioners. Autonomy 
of practitioners cannot be evaluated without considering autonomy of patients.  
V International Conscientious Objection Legislation and Case Law  
 
Other jurisdictions have taken a similar view that medical practitioners’ right to 
conscientiously object should be protected to the extent it does not unduly impact 
patients’ rights to receive legally available medical treatments. Beyond this, specific 
legislative protections of a practitioners’ right to conscientiously object vary. This 
section will briefly consider how both the United States and the United Kingdom have 
enshrined the right to conscientiously object in their legislation, to explore how other 
jurisdictions have struck a balance between the aforementioned competing rights.  
 
The surge in conscientious objection case law and legislation is most predominant in 
the United States of America.95 While a discussion of each State’s statutory protection 
of conscience is beyond the scope of this paper,96 the State which provides a liberal 
protection of a practitioner’s right to conscientiously object, Mississippi, will briefly 
be discussed.97 The discussion will then turn to the United Kingdom, which has a 
similar statutory framework to New Zealand, to demonstrate where courts have 
encountered difficulties in applying conscientious objection legislation, due to the 
lack of New Zealand case law on the subject.  
A The United States of America: Broad Protection 
 
A large proportion of the case law on conscientious objection has arisen in the United 
States. This is due, in part, to the fact that the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v 
Wade, (effectively legalising abortion)98  has been vigilantly opposed by a strong 
religious lobby, resulting in both state and federal legislation allowing practitioners to 
refuse to partake in abortion procedures. 99  This included the 1973 Church 
Amendment, one of the first widespread conscience clauses in healthcare.100  The 
difference in legislation, however, renders most of the case law inapplicable for the 
purposes of comparison with New Zealand.  
 
                                                            
95JudyAnn Bigby et al “Health Care Refusals: Undermining Quality Care for Women” (2010) National 
Health Law Program <www.healthlaw.org> at 7.  
96For a good summary see: Thaddeus Pope “Legal Briefing: Conscience Clauses and Conscientious 
Refusal” (2010) 21The Journal of Clinical Ethics 163. 
97Health Care Rights of Conscience Act Mississippi Code § 41107-5 (2013).  
98Kimberly Moss, above n 6, at 175; Wicclair, above n 3, at 15.     
99Dickens, above n 23, at 338-339.  
100TA Cavanaugh, above n 22, at 198.  
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Presently, 46 States have some from of conscientious objection legislation protecting 
healthcare professionals.101 One of the broadest statutory protections of conscientious 
objection in the United States is Mississippi’s Health Care Rights of Conscience 
Act.102 The Act allows practitioners to refuse to participate in “any phase of patient 
medical care, treatment or procedure.”103 Participation is defined in section 2(f) as 
including referring, counselling, or advising.104 The Act also protects institutions.105 
Section 3(1), however, forbids any objection on the basis of “race, colour, national 
origin, ethnicity, religion, creed or sexual orientation.”106 The initial protection is as 
wide as possible, while ensuring objection on discriminatory grounds is 
impermissible.  
B The United Kingdom  
 
The United Kingdom’s legislative protection of the right to conscientiously object is 
comparatively limited. The United Kingdom has a very similar legislative framework 
to New Zealand (discussed in part six) including a specific, statutory right of 
conscientious objection applicable to reproductive health. Section 4(1) of the 
Abortion Act 1967 (UK) (Abortion Act) states “no person shall be under any duty … 
to participate in any treatment authorised by this Act to which he has a conscientious 
objection.” 107  The person wishing to utilise this protection bears the burden of 
proof.108 Subsection 3 adds that in Scottish court proceedings, a statement on oath is 
sufficient to discharge this burden.109 The legislation, while similar to New Zealand’s, 
has led to more court disputes about the scope and extent of legally permissible 
conscientious objection in healthcare.   
 
The Abortion Act itself is clear that the right to conscientiously object has no effect 
when a termination is necessary to “save the life, or prevent grave permanent physical 
injury to the physical or mental health of a pregnant woman.”110  Differences in 
judicial opinion have arisen regarding in what other circumstances the Abortion Act 
renders conscientious objection impermissible. 111  In Doogan, Lady Smith, in the 
Outer House of the Scottish Court of Sessions considered that the right to 
conscientiously object did not apply to section 1(b) or (c) of the Abortion Act.112 
                                                            
101Mark Wicclair, above n 3, at 206.  
102Health Care Rights of Conscience Act Mississippi Code § 41107-5 (2013). 
103Section2(a). 
104Section 2(f). 
105Section 4(1). 
106Health Care Rights of Conscience Act Mississippi Code § 41107-5 (2013), s 3(1).  
107Abortion Act 1967 (UK), s 4(1).  
108Section 4(1). 
109Section 4(3).  
110Sextion 4(2).  
111Compare: Doogan, above n 72, at [75] with Doogan , above n 40, at [15].  
112At [75].  
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These subsections outline that an abortion may be performed when it is necessary to 
“prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health of the woman”113 
and where “the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of a 
pregnant women, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated.”114 The Inner House 
considered that Her Honour had erred in this interpretation,115 despite the similar 
wording in sections 4(2) and 1(b) of the Abortion Act.    
 
One of the first cases concerning the Abortion Act was Royal College of Nursing of 
the United Kingdom v Department of Health and Social Security (The RCN case).116 
While this case was not directly concerned with conscientious objection, the 
observations made by the House of Lords are important, as they have been relied on 
to support later judicial interpretations of section 4 in the Abortion Act. This case 
concerned the extent of legislative protection available for nurses administering 
prostaglandin induction methods (a less invasive method of abortion) a causative part 
of the termination.117 The nurses were concerned that the words “when the pregnancy 
is terminated by a registered medical practitioner,” (operating to legalise abortion in 
certain circumstances)118  would not offer the same statutory protection to nurses 
assisting in the procedure, rendering their acts illegal, as abortion remains criminal 
aside from the circumstances provided for in the Abortion Act.119  
 
The legal question divided judges. At first instance, Woolf J held the acts of the 
nurses were lawful.120 However, the Court of Appeal reversed this, on the basis that 
the entire procedure had to be carried out by the doctor if it was to come within the 
bounds of what was legal under section 1(1) of the Abortion Act.121 The case was 
appealed to the House of Lords. The majority in the House of Lords held that if a 
registered medical practitioner took charge of the procedure, the nurses’ involvement 
was not illegal. 122  Lord Keith emphasised the fact that the registered medical 
practitioner was “in charge” throughout. 123  Lord Roskill agreed, noting that the 
nurses’ involvement was “at all times under the control of the doctor, even though the 
doctor was not present at the time.”124 Lord Diplock reiterated these statements, by 
noting that “Parliament contemplated (conscientious objections aside) like other 
                                                            
113Abortion Act 1967 (UK), s 1(1)(b). 
114Abortion Act 1967 (UK), s 1(1)(c). 
115At [15].  
116Royal College of Nursing v Department of Health and Social Security [1981] AC 800.   
117Royal College of Nursing v Department of Health and Social Security, above n 116, at 804 (CA). 
118Abortion Act 1967 (UK), s 1(1).  
119Offences Against the Person Act 1861, ss 58 and 59.  
120Royal College of Nursing v Department of Health and Social Security, above n 116, at 806 (CA).  
121At 814.  
122At 838. 
123At 835. 
124At 838. 
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hospital treatments, it [termination] would be undertaken as a team effort.”125 Later 
cases heavily relied on this part of the judgment.  
 
Following this case was R v Salford Area Hospital Authority ex parte Janaway126 
(Janaway). The case involved a secretary, Barbara Janaway, who was dismissed for 
refusing to type a referral letter for abortion after she sought the protection that s 4(1) 
of Abortion Act 1967 provided.127  Janaway sought judicial review of the Salford 
Health Authority’s decision that her dismissal was justified.128 The case turned on the 
simple question of whether, by typing the letter, she was “being asked to ‘participate 
in any treatment authorised by the Act.”129 How the word ‘participate’ was interpreted 
was, therefore, crucial.  
 
In the Court of Appeal, the majority considered that the conscience section should be 
interpreted in light of the law prior to statutory legal abortions and the previous 
criminal consequence of assisting with abortions. 130  The partial legalisation of 
abortion in section 1(1) was therefore to be read with section 4(1).131 Slade LJ, in the 
majority, reasoned that Janaway was not participating in any treatment authorised by 
the Act, as her action in typing the letter would not have been a criminal offence prior 
to abortion being legalised in some circumstances.132  
 
The House of Lords, however, took a different approach, and agreed with the 
minority in the Court of Appeal that the word ‘participate’ did not import a 
consideration of the prior criminal status of abortion, but should be interpreted 
according to its “ordinary and natural meaning.”133In this case, according to the 
House of Lords, this meant “actually taking part in treatment administered in a 
hospital or other approved place.”134 The situation seemed relatively settled by this 
judgment, and remained so until recently.   
 
Janaway, however, was not the final word on the issue. In the Doogan litigation, the 
issue again arose as to how broadly the words “participate in any treatment authorised 
by the [Abortion] Act” should be interpreted.135 Two midwives sought confirmation 
that the protection section 4(1) offered encompassed “an entitlement to refuse to 
                                                            
125At 828. 
126 R v Salford Area Hospital Authority ex parte Janaway [1989] 1 AC 537. 
127R v Salford Area Hospital Authority, above n 126, at 537.   
128R v Salford Area Hospital Authority, above n 126 at 542 (CA).   
129R v Salford Area Hospital Authority, above n 126, at 546 (CA).  
130At 548-551.  
131At 570.  
132At 551  
133At 570. 
134 At 570. 
135Doogan, above n 40, at [12]. 
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delegate, supervise and/or support staff providing care to patients undergoing 
termination of pregnancy or feticide.”136 This would allow the midwives to have no 
contact whatsoever with patients seeking a termination. The respondents argued that 
participation only involved “activities that directly brought about the termination of a 
pregnancy” 137 and the right to conscientiously object “was not available to [the 
midwives] in respect of their duties of delegation, supervision and support.”138  
 
In the Outer House of the Scottish Court of Session, Lady Smith considered that 
‘treatment’ meant “those activities which directly bring about the termination of the 
pregnancy”139 Likewise, the word ‘participate,’ “did not extend to all those involved 
in the chain of causation.”140 Lady Smith distinguished the RCN case on the basis that 
the nurses in that case all had a “direct involvement” in the abortion.141  In her 
Honour’s view, section 4(1) of the Abortion Act did not apply to those who “did not 
take part in the objectionable activity.”142 On this basis, the midwives appeal was 
dismissed.143  
 
The case was appealed, and the Inner House of the Court of Session adopted a 
different view, holding that the right to object encompassed the activities the 
midwives contended it did.144 The Court cited the RCN case in support of its view, by 
noting that the word ‘treatment’ encompassed not simply those directly involved in 
the abortion, “but to all those involved in the process of termination.” 145  In the 
Court’s view, therefore, “the right of conscientious objection extends not only to the 
actual medical or surgical termination but to the whole process of treatment for that 
purpose.”146   
 
The Inner House reasoned that the right to conscientiously object was enshrined in the 
legislation because “the process of abortion is felt by many people to be morally 
repugnant.”147 The Court viewed this fact as justification for a wide interpretation of 
the conscientious objection section, stating “it is consistent with the reasoning that 
allowed such an objection in the first place that it should extend to any involvement in 
the process of treatment.”148  The discernible logic seems to be that, because the 
                                                            
136Doogan, above n 40, at [12].  
137Doogan, above n 40, at [53]. 
138Doogan, aboce n 40, at [53].  
139At [9]. 
140At [9]. 
141At [79].  
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subject matter is controversial, the conscience clause should be interpreted as broadly 
as possible.  
 
The Inner House dismissed concerns that this interpretation would have an adverse 
impact on staffing in hospitals. 149  Instead, they noted the problems those who 
exercised their right to conscientiously object currently faced. 150 The Court 
explained:151 
 
It is debatable whether safety would be compromised more by what [the midwives] 
proposed than by a system which places on those who may already be struggling with 
their conscience the additional burden of having to assess whether each task comes 
within the scope of their conscientious objection and of having to re-state that 
objection, possibly on a daily basis. 
 
With respect, this analysis does not address the question of what impact their 
favoured interpretation would have on hospital staffing arrangements.  
 
It is of concern that the Inner House did not factor in the impact that their 
interpretation might have on access to healthcare. Nowhere in the judgment does the 
Inner House consider the impacts of its decision on accessibility to abortions. Perhaps 
it was because abortion remains legal only in certain circumstances (a status that New 
Zealand law mirrors)152  that the Court did not consider the wider public interest 
implications of their decision. National Health Services Greater Glasgow and Clyde 
are appealing the decision. 153 The Supreme Court’s view on the topic will be 
interesting to see, if leave to appeal is given.  
 
The interpretation favoured by the Inner House hugely broadens the scope of legally 
exercisable conscientious objections in the United Kingdom to encompass seemingly 
all aspects of the ‘treatment’ of a woman undergoing an abortion, including pre and 
post-operative care, along with supervision of delegation responsibilities of staff 
caring for a woman undergoing an abortion. As Louise Finer notes, the question arises 
as to “how far up the hierarchy of a health service does the ability to conscientiously 
object to playing a supervisory role reach?”154 Aside from creating staffing difficulties 
for hospitals, the decision raises questions about how a New Zealand court faced with 
                                                            
149At [34]. 
150At [34]. 
151At [34]. 
152Crimes Act 1961, s 182.   
153BBC News “Supreme Court to Hear Appeal in Midwives Abortion Case” BBC News (online ed, 
United Kingdom, 25 June 2013). 
154Louise Finer “Conscientious Objection in Scotland: A Worrying Precedent” RHM Blog: The Blog 
for Reproductive Health Matters (14 May 2013) <http://rhmatters.wordpress.com>. 
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similar circumstances might rule.  The phrase “assist in the performance”155 in section 
46 of the Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion Act 1977, could theoretically be 
interpreted broadly, in a similar way to how “participation in any treatment” was by 
the Inner House.  
 
Doogan encapsulates a trend toward a resurgence of conscientious objection litigation 
and legislation.156 From an access to healthcare perspective, this trend is worrying in 
its ability to effectively limit women’s ability to access legally available reproductive 
health services. Case law from the United Kingdom also demonstrates the difficulties 
courts have had in interpreting conscientious objection sections. Difficulties have 
arisen in delineating who, and what activities, are protected by legislation’s 
conscience section. The issues are primarily linked to the scope of protection, a matter 
New Zealand conscientious objection law is also unclear on.  
VI Current New Zealand Law Relating to Conscientious Objection  
 
New Zealand’s conscience protection legislation currently exists on an ad hoc basis. 
The legislature has incorporated conscience clauses when they have been considered 
necessary, seemingly only in the context of reproductive health.157 Women, therefore, 
tend to be most affected by practitioners exercising this right. The right to 
conscientiously object to the provision of healthcare in New Zealand is governed by 
two key Acts: the Contraception Sterilisation and Abortion Act 1977 and the Health 
Practitioners Competence Assurance Act 2003. Guidelines promulgated by 
professional bodies are also used to regulate practitioners exercising their right to 
conscientiously-object. 158  ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
A  Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion Act 1977 
  
An explicit conscience clause is contained in the Contraception, Sterilisation and 
Abortion Act 1977 (“CSA”). Section 46 sets out that:159  
 
                                                            
155Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion Act, s 46(1)(a).  
156See the comments of the British Medical Association: British Medical Association “Expressions of 
Doctor’s Beliefs” (26 August 2012) British Medical Association <www.bma.org.nz>. 
157See for example: Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion Act 1977, s 46 and the Health 
Practitioners Competence Assurance Act 2003, s 174.  
158 Office of the Health and Disability Commissioner The Code of Rights (2004) <www.hdc.org.nz>; 
and Medical Council of New Zealand Good Medical Practice (Medical Council of New Zealand, April 
2013).   
159Section 46.  
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(1) Notwithstanding anything in any other enactment, or any rule of law, or the terms 
of any oath or of any contract (whether of employment or otherwise), no medical 
practitioner, nurse, or other person shall be under any obligation— 
(a) to perform or assist in the performance of an abortion or any operation 
undertaken or to be undertaken for the purpose of rendering the patient 
sterile: 
(b) to fit or assist in the fitting, or supply or administer or assist in the supply 
or administering, of any contraceptive, or to offer or give any advice relating 
to contraception,— 
if he objects to doing so on grounds of conscience. 
 
While subsection 1 does not expressly include advice, subsection 1(b) is clear that the 
protection encompasses giving contraceptive advice.  
 
Section 46 expressly states it has no effect on section 5 of the CSA.160 The latter 
section mandates that sexual violation complainants must be informed of the 
availability of contraception (presumably the emergency contraceptive pill (ECP)) to 
“avoid the risk of pregnancy” 161  This contraception may be supplied by the 
practitioner themselves, a colleague, or family planning clinic.162 The wording of the 
section suggests that the medical practitioner is still under no personal duty to provide 
the contraception themselves, as section 5(1)(b) recognises the secondary option of 
advising the patient of her right to seek the contraception elsewhere. The only 
exceptions are where the medical practitioner is satisfied that there was no 
penetration, or if the complainant “expresses a contrary wish.”163 The fact that section 
5 sets out a statutory duty to advise about contraceptives when section 46 does not do 
so suggests that, aside from sexual violation cases, conscientiously objecting medical 
practitioners have no legal duty to advise patients about any of the matters set out in 
section 46.  
 
The legal position as a result of these sections is that, even in the case of medical 
emergency, a New Zealand medical practitioner is permitted to object to performing 
an abortion, and medical practitioners and any other persons (including pharmacists, 
or nurses) are able to object to supplying any contraceptive, with no correlative duty 
to directly refer, including in sexual violation cases.  
 
B Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Act 2003  
 
                                                            
160 Section 46.  
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162 Section 5(1)(a). 
163 Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion Act 1977, s 5.  
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The case law suggests that section 46 of the CSA should be read in tandem with 
section 174 of the HPCA.164  Section 174 sets out that a health practitioner who 
objects to providing reproductive health service must inform the patient requesting the 
service that it can be obtained from another health practitioner.165 Health practitioner 
is defined in section 5 as “a person who is … registered with an authority as a 
practitioner of a particular health profession.” 166  It is therefore broader than the 
definition of ‘medical practitioner’ under the CSA, encompassing pharmacists and 
nurses.167   
 
Judicial interpretation of section 174 has reinforced that it has a broader effect than 
section 46 alone.168 In the Hallagan v New Zealand Medical Council case, Mackenzie 
J noted that: 169  
 
An objection on grounds of conscience is not confined to the right of conscientious 
objection conferred by Parliament in s 46, or specifically recognised in some other 
way. The reference extends to any conscientious objection held by a doctor relating to 
abortion, and the section does not limit or confine the extent of such a conscientious 
objection. 
  
Exactly how wide this section can be interpreted remains to be fully determined.   
 
Section 174 imposes a duty on a health practitioner exercising the right to 
conscientiously object to inform a patient requesting a disputed service of this 
objection.170 Accordingly, it is only when a patient specifically requests the disputed 
treatment that the duty is engaged. When this occurs, the practitioner must inform the 
person seeking the particular treatment of their right to attain it elsewhere. This 
demonstrates that when seeking to strike a balance between the deeply held moral, 
ethical or religious beliefs of practitioners and the rights of patients to receive legally 
available healthcare, the legislature deemed that indirect referral was preferable. 
Indirect referral is a good starting point as it ensures that the patient is aware of their 
right to receive the disputed treatment elsewhere. However, section 174 is 
problematic as it assumes the patient has the requisite knowledge to request the 
disputed service.  
 
                                                            
164Hallagan v New Zealand Medical Council [2010] HC Wellington Civ-2010-485-222, 2 December 
2010 at [10].  
165Section 174.  
166Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Act 2003, s 5.   
167‘Medical practitioner’ is defined as a person registered with the Medical Council: Contraception, 
Sterilisation and Abortion Act, s 2.   
168Hallagan v New Zealand Medical Council, above n 164, at [19]. 
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C Other Relevant Law 
 
(i) Domestic human rights legislation  
 
Beyond these two specific statutory sections, conscientious objection is subject to 
broader legislative protection. As previously indicated, conscientious objection raises 
human rights arguments. Part of the protection for the right, therefore, is found in 
domestic human rights instruments. This includes sections 13 and 15 of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (BORA). Section 13 sets out that “everyone has the 
right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief, including the right to 
adopt and to hold opinions without interference.”171 Additionally, section 15 states 
that “every person has the right to manifest that person’s religion or belief in worship, 
observance practice or teaching, either individually or in community with others, and 
either in public or in private.”172 Section 6 is an important interpretative provision, 
which sets out that “where an enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent 
with the rights and freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights Act,” this is preferred.173 
On this approach, a broader interpretation of the conscientious objection provision 
may be preferred. This was affirmed in the Hallagan case concerning conscientious 
objection, discussed shortly.174 
 
These provisions prima facie form part of the background protection of the right to 
conscientiously object in healthcare. The right may be subject to a section 5 test 
(whether any limitation on the right is demonstrably justified in a free or democratic 
society).175 What a New Zealand court would decide in a case based on BORA is 
difficult to predict. It is safe to assume that the importance of access to legally 
available medical services would be an important public interest consideration. 
Furthermore, case law from the United Kingdom has suggested that courts should be 
reluctant to intervene when employment purports to infringe on religious rights, or 
where a balance has already been struck by the legislature.176 
 
(ii) Guidelines  
 
Guidelines promulgated by medical bodies are also an important regulatory 
mechanism. Conscientious objection in healthcare is an area where practice may be of 
greater importance than the law. Medical professional bodies have set standards for 
                                                            
171New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s13.  
172Section 15.  
173Section 6.   
174At [17].  
175New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 5.  
176See the discussion in Doogan, above n 40, at [48]-[58].  
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what should occur where a practitioner feels his or her personal beliefs conflict with a 
patient, either personally or in terms of treatment sought. For example, the Medical 
Council of New Zealand’s Good Medical Practice guidelines state that a 
practitioner’s personal beliefs, “including political, religious and moral beliefs” 
should not affect the doctor patient relationship.177 If the practitioner fears that his or 
her personal beliefs might affect treatment, this must be explained, whilst informing 
the patient that they have the right to see another doctor.178 In this respect, it mirrors 
section 174 of the HPCA. This guideline seems to leave it to practitioners to 
determine whether or not their personal beliefs will affect the doctor/patient 
relationship. This has the potential to create problems, given that it assumes the 
practitioner will be aware of any discomfiture felt by the patient.  
 
The Health and Disability Commissioner’s Code of Rights also contains rights which 
are relevant to a discussion of conscientious objection.179 Right 3 states that “every 
consumer has the right to have services provided in a manner that respects the dignity 
and independence of the individual.”180 Right 4 also sets out that “every consumer has 
the right to have services provided in a manner consistent with his or her needs,”181 
while right 6 sets out the right to be fully informed.182 These provisions are important 
in any disciplinary proceeding against a practitioner.  
 
The bulk of the guidelines suggest that the patient’s health is paramount and if there is 
any conflict with the doctor’s moral, ethical or religious beliefs it is the practitioner’s 
responsibility to take appropriate action to curtail any potential risk to the patient, by 
informing them of their right to seek another practitioner.  
 
Guidelines are primarily effective as a measure of medical practice. They may, 
accordingly, be most effective as an ambulance at the bottom of the cliff, in 
measuring bad medical conduct after the fact of a complaint. Interestingly, the 
Doogan case raised questions about the legitimacy of such guidelines. The Inner 
House stated that: 183 
 
Great respect should be given to the advice provided hitherto by the professional 
bodies, but prior practice does not necessarily dictate interpretation. Moreover, when 
                                                            
177Medical Council of New Zealand Good Medical Practice (Medical Council of New Zealand, April 
2013) at [20].  
178Medical Council of New Zealand Good Medical Practice, above n 177, at [20]. 
179Office of the Health and Disability Commissioner The Code of Rights (2004), above n 4.  
180At 1.  
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the subject of the advice concerns a matter of law, there is always the possibility that 
the advice from the professional body is incorrect,”  
 
Case law, therefore, remains paramount in interpreting legislation.  
 
D The Legal Status of Abortion in New Zealand  
 
Understanding the significance of the sole case on the right to conscientiously object 
in New Zealand, Hallagan v New Zealand Medical Council necessitates a brief 
discussion of the legal status of abortion in New Zealand. As in the United Kingdom, 
abortion in New Zealand is legal in relatively limited circumstances. The starting 
point is section 187A of the Crimes Act 1961. This section sets out the precise 
circumstances under which it is not a crime to procure an abortion.184 These include 
where the child is a result of incest,185 where the pregnancy is the result of sexual 
violation,186 or where the pregnancy would result in “serious danger … to the life, or 
the physical or mental health of the women.”187  While the CSA permits abortion in 
these limited circumstances, it has, as Mark Rankin notes “failed to change the 
fundamental criminal status of abortion.”188  
 
Practice has, however, diverged from the law in this area, with the Abortion 
Supervisory Committee reporting that 15,863 abortions occurred in the 2011 calendar 
year.189 Of this number, 97.6% were performed under the danger to mental health 
ground.190 The number of women receiving abortions under this ground suggests a 
shift from the original legislative purpose of the CSA.191 Both sides of the abortion 
debate believe that the mental health ground is being misused for “abortion on 
request.”192  
 
This situation led to pro-life group, Right to Life, taking the Abortion Supervisory 
Committee to court over its alleged failure to properly supervise how abortions were 
performed in New Zealand.193 While a full discussion of this case is beyond the scope 
                                                            
184Crimes Act 1961, s 187A. It is criminal in other circumstances, see Crimes Act 1961, see s 182.  
185Crimes Act 1961, s 187A(1)(b). 
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188Mark Rankin “The Disappearing Crime of Abortion and the Recognition of a Woman’s Right to 
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192 Right to Life New Zealand Incorporated v The Abortion Supervisory Committee [2008] 2 NZLR 825 
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of this paper,194 the majority of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, believing 
that the task of abortion law reform was best left for Parliament. 195  However, 
Parliament seems reluctant to do so, leading to the current “impasse,”196 recognised 
by the Court of Appeal in the Right to Life case. The disjoint between law and 
practice is particularly important for regulating conscientious objection in the field of 
reproductive healthcare.  
 
E Case law: Hallagan v Medical Council of New Zealand  
 
The sole case on conscientious objection arose when the New Zealand Health 
Practitioners Alliance, a body formed to protect the rights of medical practitioners 
opposed to certain medical practices, challenged the New Zealand Medical Council’s 
decision to circulate a document entitled Beliefs and Medical Practice. 197  This 
document sought to better regulate situations where a medical practitioner’s personal 
beliefs conflicted with a patient’s medical procedure or treatment in the context of 
abortion. 198  The case centred upon the duty to refer in circumstances where the 
practitioner objected to abortion. In particular, section 32(1) of the CSA was 
considered, which states: 199   
 
“Every medical practitioner … who is consulted by … a female who wishes to have 
an abortion shall, if requested to do so … arrange for the case to be considered and 
dealt with.”  
 
This section raises questions about whether referral was required.   
 
Differences of opinions arose in Hallagan as to precisely what section 32(1) 
mandated.200 The Medical Council argued that where a medical practitioner opposed 
to abortion was faced with a patient seeking an abortion, they could exercise their 
right to conscientiously object, but must “arrange for the case to be considered and 
dealt with.”201  The Medical Council was essentially asserting that section 32(1) of the 
CSA imposed a direct referral requirement.202  In support of this proposition, the 
                                                            
194For more details see: Shang-Chin Lai “The Scope of the Abortion Supervisory Committee’s 
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Medical Council argued arranging for the case to be considered did not constitute 
‘assisting’ in the abortion, therefore, section 46 had no application.203 By contrast, 
counsel for Dr Hallagan argued that the only duty imposed by the section on a 
conscientiously objecting medical practitioner faced with a woman requesting an 
abortion was to inform her of her right to have her case considered by a colleague.204 
 
Mackenzie J considered that section 32(1) contained “an obligation, expressed in 
mandatory terms, imposed on a women’s own doctor who is consulted by a woman to 
have an abortion, if the request is made,”205 to consider the case, which section 46 did 
not exempt doctors from.206 However, his Honour reasoned that section 174 of the 
HPCA provided a wider protection than section 46 of the CSA, and entitled doctors to 
refuse to consider the case.207 Mackenzie J did not believe Parliament had intended to 
impose a direct referral requirement on medical practitioners who chose to 
conscientiously object in this circumstance.208 In support of this view, His Honour 
noted that “matters of conscience are intensely personal.”209 
 
As a result, Mackenzie J stated that objecting doctors faced with a woman seeking an 
abortion had two options:210  
 
(a) If the conscience of the doctor would be infringed by arranging for the case to be 
considered and dealt with under ss 32 and 33, the doctor may decline the patient‘s 
request to do so. The doctor must in that event give the information required by s 
174(2). The duty to give that information is a statutory one, not one which is subject 
to additional professional obligations. 
(b) If the conscience of the doctor would not be infringed by arranging for the case to 
be referred to another doctor for consideration, the doctor must take that step. The 
making of that referral is a matter of medical practice, to be performed in accordance 
with proper professional standards. 
 
This approach defers to the doctor in question to determine which course of action is 
best, according to the bounds of their own conscience.  
 
In addition, the previously discussed disjoint between the legal situation and practice 
in regard to abortion has the effect of creating a potential lacuna in the CSA. A 
doctor, opposed to abortion, after considering the case, believing that none of the 
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grounds in section 187A apply, refuses to refer the women seeking an abortion 
onwards, whereas a doctor who was not opposed would have referred. This issue 
arose in the Hallagan case, where the plaintiffs asserted: “if the doctor does not 
consider that any of those [section 187] grounds may apply then no further action is 
required. Good medical practice may commend that the doctor consider informing the 
woman that she may consult another medical practitioner but that is not mandated by 
the section.”211 Mackenzie J disagreed with this interpretation.212  
 
His Honour considered that once a practitioner engaged with the consultation, they 
had to see that consultation through to its completion, including any referral.213 
Mackenzie J commented that “a doctor who engages medically with the case by 
considering it also undertakes a responsibility, both statutory and professional to deal 
with it in accordance with section ss 32 and 33.”214  His Honour considered that: 215   
 
The proper course for a doctor who has a conscientious objection to carrying to its 
conclusion the statutory process of considering and if appropriate referring the case is 
to decline to embark upon that process.  
 
This reinforces the duty of non-abandonment.  
 
To summarise, a medical practitioner is under a mandatory duty to arrange to have the 
case considered under section 32(1), a duty that section 46(1) of the CSA had no 
effect on.216  Despite this, section 174 of the HPCA had a broader effect, and allowed 
a doctor to refuse to consider the case from the outset.217 In this event, the doctor must 
give the information under section 174(2). If a doctor chose to engage with 
considering the case however, they had an obligation to see the process through, 
including any referral necessitated as a result.218  
 
The result of the case was that the Medical Council’s document, Beliefs and Medical 
Practice, insofar as it mandated a referral requirement in all circumstances, was 
subject to a direction issued by the Court requiring it to be reconsidered,219 in light of 
the finding that section 174(2) was “a maximum obligation, and not one which may 
be supplemented by the imposition of professional standards.”220 
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The fact that there has only been one case in New Zealand on conscientious objection 
during the thirty-five years it has been in operation seems to suggest a lack of 
problems with the regulation of conscientious objection. The Ministry of Health 
reported that it had received no complaints from a member of the public about a 
practitioner exercising his or her right to conscientiously object to providing any form 
of reproductive health services.221 Lack of complaints, however, does not necessarily 
indicate a lack of problems.  
 
Reproductive health services, particularly abortion, are a highly sensitive area. 
Women may feel unable to question the legitimacy of their practitioner’s refusal to 
provide the disputed treatment for a variety of reasons: most notably, the power 
imbalance between practitioners and patients, a lack of education, embarrassment, or, 
in the case of abortion, social stigma. Because of the sensitivities of some of the 
issues involved, the law alone can never be a complete answer in the area of 
conscientious objection, but it can provide an impetus to good practice, which is 
essential. These points will be considered further in part eight.  
VII Discussion  
A Too Narrow, and too Broad  
 
As the prior analysis sets out, the protection of conscientious objection in New 
Zealand is both too narrow and too broad. Arguably, it is too broad in allowing 
practitioners to conscientiously object in situations of medical emergency that 
necessitate immediate action, or where the efficacy of the treatment is time 
dependent, such as the ECP. The consequences range from death, to minor 
inconvenience when patients cannot get contraception from their nearest pharmacies, 
with unintended pregnancies lying somewhere in the middle. The death of Savita 
Halappanavar as a result of septicaemia after being denied an abortion when 
miscarrying, albeit under a different legislative framework, 222  provides a tragic 
reminder to consider the need to properly address the status of conscientious objection 
in New Zealand before a similar tragedy occurs here.  
 
Simultaneously, it is too narrow. By limiting conscientious objection to reproductive 
health services administered pursuant to sections 46 of the CSA and 174 of the 
HPCA, the legislature has failed to take into account the fact that there are very real 
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moral and ethical dilemmas arising every day in healthcare outside of the 
reproductive health arena, namely euthanasia, should it be legalised. 223  If we 
subscribe to the opinion that conscientious objection is worthy of protection as a 
result of the risk of moral distress to practitioners, any conscience clause in legislation 
should be drafted in a manner which is sufficiently robust to deal with new 
developments in medicine that create ethical issues. Interestingly, the British Medical 
Association has recently stated it supported practitioners exercising a right to refuse to 
withdraw life saving treatment, suggesting that the law is not keeping pace with the 
advent of new medical technologies 224 More pressingly, the current, limited, 
protection may stall what some view as favourable legislative developments, such as 
euthanasia, because the protection for medical practitioners who conscientiously 
object is perceived to be insufficient.    
 
B Imprecision  
 
Difficulties with imprecise conscience clauses have led to litigation in other 
jurisdictions. Disputes have arisen about whether activities such as pre and post-
operative care, 225  supervision and delegation, 226  or typing referral letters 227  are 
protected by conscientious objection legislation. This case law arises from a lack of 
legislative precision. While no section can prevent the risk of litigation entirely, the 
current New Zealand provision increases it.  
 
Imprecise conscience clauses may also raise practical problems. Hospitals or other 
medical organizations may have difficulty knowing whether a particular activity is 
protected by conscientious objection legislation, and staffing accordingly. This point 
was alluded to by the National Health Services in the Doogan case, whose counsel 
argued that:228  
 
The interpretation argued for by [the midwives] would lead to difficult clinical and 
legal distinctions in practice. The practical outcome would be almost impossible to 
manage, could compromise safety and would lead to dual standards of nursing care. 
Any form of conscientious objection had obvious effects on the running of hospitals 
in terms of costs, staffing and the increased burden on staff who did not have such an 
objection.  
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A conscience clause that is clear about the extent to which any of these activities are 
included within the scope of that which might be conscientiously objected to might 
avoid some of these difficulties. However, the first task is to uncover precisely what a 
new conscientious objection clause in New Zealand should seek to protect.   
VIII Reform  
 
Reform of the law around conscientious objection is urgently needed. At present, the 
law relating to conscientious objection is simultaneously too specific, and too 
encompassing. The following suggestions seek to remedy this. The decision in 
Hallagan rendered section 46 of the CSA redundant. Accordingly, this paper 
recommends removing section 46 from the CSA. A single clause based on section 
174 of the HPCA, incorporating the following recommendations will be compiled in 
part nine. The Ministry of Health is currently undertaking a review of the HPCA, 
providing ideal timing for a concurrent review of the right to conscientiously object 
enshrined in the legislation.229  
 
A legislative framework should be flexible enough to accommodate development, 
whilst ensuring a balance between practitioners’ rights to adhere to their conscience, 
and patients’ rights to receive legally available medical treatments, where appropriate. 
In the event of irreconcilable conflict, a patient’s rights should take precedence.     
 
A   Broader Conscience Protection 
 
The current legislative framework in New Zealand for conscientious objection 
reinforces a hierarchy of beliefs. The current law is applicable only within the area of 
reproductive health services. A more cogent and fair solution would be broadening 
protection to encompass other areas of healthcare, where equally valid personal, 
moral and ethical grounds for conscientious objection arise. As TA Cavanaugh notes 
“a sensible conscience clause does not take an ad hoc approach to objection by 
singling out specific currently and widely recognised controverted interventions.”230  
 
As previously discussed in part three, the main rationales for protecting the right to 
conscientiously object in healthcare are protecting freedom of conscience and 
avoiding practitioners’ moral distress. To properly achieve this, the current protection 
needs to be broadened beyond that of protecting predominantly Christian religious 
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beliefs.231 As Julian Savulescu notes “to treat religious values differently from secular 
moral values is to discriminate unfairly against the secular, a practice not uncommon 
in medical ethics.”232 This paper therefore argues that the protection of conscientious 
objection should be broadened to be applicable to all healthcare services, to 
encompass secular moral, ethical or cultural beliefs beyond that of an opposition to 
contraception or abortions.   
 
Broadening the legislation has the added advantage of providing an already 
established framework for euthanasia, if legalised. Currently, clause 27 of the End of 
Life Choice Bill outlines that neither practitioners nor solicitors are obligated to 
participate, but must provide “alternative sources of medical assistance and legal 
advice.”233 In this respect, it does not differ greatly from the recommendations in this 
paper. As euthanasia will almost always be a planned medical treatment, this paper 
predicts it would be unlikely that a practitioner would be forced to participate in a 
euthanasia procedure against their will, as may arise in the context of emergency 
abortions.  
 
It may, however, be preferable to keep euthanasia contained within its own legislative 
framework. The End of Life Choice Bill sets out its own regulatory framework; 
including a Registrar who will keep records of “End of Life Directives,”234 and a 
statutory review body. As a result, the legislature may wish to keep records of the 
number of practitioners choosing to conscientiously object to the practice of 
euthanasia. In either case, the point remains that broadening the initial statutory scope 
of the areas of healthcare in which the right to conscientiously object is available has 
the advantage of establishing a well-understood framework for practitioners wishing 
to object to future controversial healthcare services. This may in turn make law 
reform easier for Parliament, leading to less stagnated legislation such as the arguably 
outdated framework for abortion in New Zealand.   
 
Broadening the initial scope of protection to encompass healthcare services outside of 
reproductive health is a more equitable approach. It is not, however, without risk, 
namely in rendering the scope of protection unjustifiably wide. As Fred Zacharias has 
noted, in a different context, systems would collapse if professionals only adhered to 
“idiosyncratic unbounded notions of right and wrong.” 235  However, there are 
mechanisms available to prevent this. If the broadening of conscientious objection 
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protection was implemented in tandem with the other recommendations contained in 
this paper, there would be sufficient safeguards to ensure access to legally available 
medical services was not compromised. This paper argues that while there is value in 
a broadly based protection of conscience, there should be correspondingly clear limits 
on the circumstances in which it can be exercised. 
B  Stronger Caveats  
1 Scope of protection 
 
The clause should make it clear who is protected. Difficulties arise when conscience 
sections do not clearly demarcate whose rights are protected. This paper argues that 
only those directly involved in providing the disputed health treatment should fall 
within the bounds of the legislative protection. This would encompass being part of 
the surgical team conducting a termination, but exclude pre or post-operative care, 
activities which it is contended take the protection too far.    
2 Beliefs should not make the practice of medicine impossible  
 
The first caveat of the new, broader, conscience clause should ensure that the belief in 
question does not create insurmountable difficulties for employers of conscientiously 
objecting practitioners. The protected conscientious belief should not be 
fundamentally inconsistent with the practitioner’s ability to fulfil their professional 
duties. This inevitably incorporates some elements of Mark Wicclair’s incompatibility 
thesis.236 As TA Cavanaugh notes “a sensible conscience clause must be grounded in 
a professed account of medicine … it does not cover, for example, objecting to 
relieving a patient’s pain based on one’s religious beliefs in pain’s redemptive value 
or one’s experiential belief that pain builds character.”237 This also incorporates some 
elements of what Antonmaria termed “social norms.”238 
 
Practicalities dictate that if the belief in question renders the practice of medicine 
impossible or hugely difficult for employers, that belief should be excluded. While 
broadening out the scope of protection is desirable, it cannot come at the expense of a 
practitioner being able to practice medicine. For example, under this rule, a Jehovah’s 
Witness who is a medical practitioner, and according to those beliefs, refused to 
provide blood transfusions, would not be protected.  
 
An example closer to the cusp of what might be protected is a pharmacist who 
objected to providing any form of contraceptives. This paper argues that, as 93,809 
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consultations for contraception occur per year,239 pharmacists who object to providing 
any contraceptives should be excluded from protection, due to their objection creating 
staffing difficulties beyond what should reasonably be accommodated by employers.  
 
This argument could be taken further by asserting that conscientious objection should 
only be permissible where the belief is supported by science. Kimberly Moss outlines 
this viewpoint:240 
 
Looking to pharmacists who refuse to dispense Plan B [the ECP] emergency 
contraceptives on the belief that this type of contraceptive prevents implantation and 
is a type of embryocyde, the Ethics Committee … looked to a large body of published 
evidence which supports the proposition that emergency contraceptives actually 
prevent ovulation and lead to the release of ova that are resistant to fertilization. 
These misconceptions should not be disseminated by acting on beliefs that are not 
based in scientific truths 
 
Essentially, Moss argues that any conscientious objection should be firmly backed up 
by science. This requirement risks uncertainty at the edges, as science is continually 
evolving. In addition, this viewpoint misunderstands the rationale of conscientious 
objection, which is to protect a practitioner whose conscience dictates against 
participating in the particular treatment, regardless of its scientific base. Personal 
values may not be compatible with scientific knowledge.241 This paper, therefore, 
rejects this approach.      
3 Objection should be on the basis of the healthcare service  
 
The proposed protection of the right to conscientiously object should focus on the 
particular service, not the type of patient242 Conscience should be focussed on the 
practitioner’s beliefs and not on objecting to a particular class of patient. The British 
Medical Association has stated that: 243 
 
Where it comes to classes of people, there is usually no doubt that the intervention 
could be clinically beneficial: the objection arises from the perceived nature of the 
patient, not the intervention. Objecting in principle to the termination of a pregnancy 
is very different to objecting to providing fertility treatment to same sex couples. In 
our view the latter would always be unacceptable. 
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In this regard, the State of Mississippi’s conscience clause provides a good example 
of a conscience clause that provides broad initial protection, while ensuring it does 
not enable discrimination, through a subsection. 244  A subsection similar to the 
Mississippi legislation may be worth implementing to avoid conscientious objection 
becoming a shield for discriminatory medical practices.  
 
Courts would not find it difficult to distinguish between a genuine conscientious 
objection and one based on discriminatory beliefs. In a different context, the Totara 
Hill Farms v Davidson decision recently indicated a willingness on behalf of courts to 
look behind the substantive decision making of an employer,245 a precedent which 
could be relevant in the context of conscientious objection, in the way that it looks 
behind the purported rationale for the decision.  
4  Veracity of the objection  
 
A protection to ensure the veracity of any practitioner claiming to hold a 
conscientious objection to providing legally available medical treatments might also 
be beneficial. Section 4(1) of United Kingdom’s Abortion Act 1967 states that “in any 
legal proceedings the burden of proof of conscientious objection shall rest on the 
person claiming to rely on it.”246 Accordingly, it is up to a practitioner to prove that 
their objection falls within the bounds of what could be considered ‘conscientious’ in 
the event of any subsequent disciplinary proceedings or litigation. While this may 
seem an easy threshold to satisfy, the risk of penalties for making a false declaration 
or lying on oath provide powerful incentives for remaining honest and, 
correspondingly, may deter those who do not have a genuine objection from any 
subsequent court proceedings.  
 
This paper considers this approach to be worthwhile. As Christopher Meyers and 
Robert Woods have argued, engaging conscience protection should not be “so 
simplistic as to trivialise moral decision making”247 Conscientious objection based on 
genuine, deeply held beliefs is the essence of what the current protections exist for. In 
determining veracity, courts could consider factors such as the length of time the 
practitioner had held the belief, and whether the practitioner had disclosed this belief, 
among other things. 
C  Notice  
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At a bare minimum, any statutory protection of conscientious objection in healthcare 
should be underpinned by a requirement that all objecting practitioners give notice of 
any ethical or moral objection to the provision of a legal healthcare service. This 
could be simply and easily done in the form of a leaflet or sign in a general practice, 
or, in hospitals, to an employer.  
 
Giving notice of any objection at the outset may prevent problems arising. In Dr Lee’s 
case, had he informed Miss Pont from the beginning about his objection to providing 
the contraceptive pill, or other reproductive treatments, she may not have faced the 
inconvenience of having to wait for a doctor’s appointment, only to be denied her 
medication.248 Disclosure of a conscientious objection to employers, or patients is 
vital. Transparency has the potential do most of the ground work towards ensuring 
patient safety, particularly for general practitioners.  
 
Notice also ensures that relationships of trust and confidence are preserved, and a 
patient is not surprised by a practitioner’s subsequent objection. In this way, 
disclosure is important for informed consent.249 Notice would benefit new patients, as 
they would already be aware of any difficulties they might face in seeking a particular 
healthcare service.  
D   Register 
 
To increase the effectiveness of disclosure requirements, an established body should 
keep a register of practitioners who conscientiously object to the provision of certain 
healthcare services. There is already an organisation dedicated to the protection of 
practitioners who exercise the right to conscientiously object in New Zealand,250 
suggesting structures exist to implement this requirement. Cost, however, is a factor 
for consideration. Accordingly, more discussion with the Ministry of Health about 
how feasible this requirement is would be necessary before any concrete 
recommendations could be made. 
 
A register could attain statistics about the number of medical professionals in New 
Zealand who conscientious object, as there is currently limited information about how 
prevalent conscientious objection in healthcare is under the current law, or how many 
practitioners would wish to exercise this right under a broader version of section 174 
of the HPCA.  
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249TA Cavanaugh, above n 22, at 204-205. 
250New Zealand Health Professionals Alliance “About NZHPA” New Zealand Health Professionals 
Alliance <www.nzhpa.org>.  
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A register would assist in ensuring that patient care is not compromised by 
conscientious objection. By comparing a record of objecting practitioners with the 
number of practitioners willing to perform the problematic treatment, numbers could 
be monitored to ensure that there are sufficient practitioners conveniently located to 
provide treatment when necessary. The Ministry of Health could thereby ensure an 
adequate number of health professionals within the area (or hospital) who were 
willing to provide the treatment in question.  
 
Simultaneously, a register may insulate practitioners from having to provide 
treatments that go against their conscience. If numbers of objection practitioners were 
monitored, and corresponding pre-emptive action taken, the risk of a medical 
practitioner being forced to form an objectionable treatment in an emergency would 
decrease.  
 
Both disclosure requirements and a register may raise privacy concerns for objecting 
practitioners, who might feel targeted on account of their beliefs. A possible solution 
is that the list of objecting practitioners (excluding general practitioners, who should 
publically disclose the healthcare services they object to) would be only available and 
managed by the Ministry of Health. If practitioners are willing to refuse a legally 
available treatment on the basis of conscientious objection, they should be willing to 
disclose this fact to the Ministry of Health in the interests of patient safety. 
E   Disclosure of all Available and Appropriate Medical Options  
 
Practitioners should be obliged to inform a patient of all the appropriate medical 
options, even if they do not specifically request the disputed treatment. This 
requirement ensures the patient is informed of all their available options, whilst 
protecting the medical practitioner’s right to conscientiously object to providing the 
treatment in question.  
 
For example, consider the situation of a female patient going to her doctor with a 
concern about the risk of a sexually transmitted infection as a result of unprotected 
sex. The practitioner should be obligated to inform the patient of the availability of 
the ECP as a possible treatment, even if they personally object to providing it. 
Receiving medical advice should never be contingent on the individual patient’s 
knowledge of recommended treatments. Currently, section 174 of the HPCA focuses 
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on the act of requesting to trigger the obligation. 251  Concomitantly, section 174 
specifically states that giving advice is in included within the protection.252  
 
Evidence suggests advice is given in practice. A study in the New England Journal of 
Medicine suggested a large majority of medical practitioners considered disclosure 
important.253  Specifically, when asked whether a physician had “an obligation to 
present all possible options to the patient, including information about obtaining the 
requested procedure,” where the physician objected to that procedure, 86% of those 
surveyed believed they did.254  However, in a field subject to high regulation this 
requirement should be legally mandatory.  
F   Obligation to Refer  
 
Referral has consistently been a vexed area of conscientious objection legislation. As 
previously discussed in part three of this paper, referral is problematic. Practitioners 
who exercise the right to conscientiously object dispute that any legislative provision 
of conscientious objection can protect them, while simultaneously rendering them 
complicit by forcing them to directly refer a patient to a non-objecting practitioner.255 
Indirect referral is less contentious, as commentators have suggested it involves less 
moral complicity.256 Current New Zealand law relating to conscientious objection 
supports indirect referral as an appropriate balance. The practitioner seeking the 
protection of section 174 of the HPCA must disclose their objection and inform the 
patient of their right to seek the disputed service elsewhere.257  
 
This paper argues that indirect referral alone is insufficient. While indirect referral 
may be adequate where there is no emergency situation, and the patient is able to 
freely and conveniently access the service elsewhere, it is risky to assume that this 
will be always be the case. This view is supported by the Abortion Supervisory 
Committee, who, in its 2012 report commented on the worryingly “uneven regional 
availability of certifying consultants.”258 Indirect referral risks compounding access 
issues for women from rural areas, potentially leading to an institutional form of 
discrimination. It also may reduce access to legally available healthcare services for 
those who are poor, unaware of other places the disputed service is available, or 
unable to travel to get it for a variety of reasons.  
                                                            
251Section 174(1)(a). 
252Section 174(1)(a). 
253Farr A Curlin, M.D Ryan, Marshall H Chin and John D Lantos “Religion, Conscience, and 
Controversial Clinical Practices” (2007) 354 New Eng J Med 594 at 597.  
254Curlin, Ryan, Chin Lantos “Religion, above n 253, at 597. 
255Wicclair, above n 3,at 37. 
256Frank Chervenak and Laurence McCullough quoted in Wicclair, above n 3,at 37. 
257Section 174.   
258Abortion Supervisory Committee, above n 189, at 3.   
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In these circumstances, it is the objecting practitioners’ responsibility to ensure that 
patient is able to access the disputed service elsewhere. In most cases, this will be 
easy to satisfy, by referring to a colleague nearby. A direct referral requirement would 
protect New Zealand’s most vulnerable women and ensure that they too, have access 
to easily available reproductive health services.  
G   Emergency Situations and Time-Dependent Treatment   
 
In medical emergencies, or where a treatment is only effective within a specific 
timeframe (such as the ECP) conscientious objection should not be permissible unless 
another practitioner willing to provide the disputed treatment is immediately 
available. This is because refusal in these circumstances places patient safety and 
welfare at risk. When striking a balance between the competing rights may no longer 
be possible, patient safety should receive preference.  
 
It is of concern that there is presently no specific provision forbidding conscientious 
objection in these circumstances. This may place women at risk, if an abortion is 
necessary as a consequence of a medical emergency and the only practitioner 
available to provide it conscientiously objects to doing so. The effects of a refusal to 
provide an abortion in these circumstances have already been demonstrated by the 
death of Savita Halappanavar in Ireland.259  This death lead Ireland to change its 
abortion law, with the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act passed recently.260 In 
addition, the European Court of Human Rights has recently had cause to consider the 
adverse effects unregulated institutional conscientious objection has on patients.261  
 
There is a risk of similar occurrences in New Zealand. A women presenting to an 
emergency department with an urgent need for an abortion to save her life might be 
faced with a surgeon in a rural hospital who conscientiously objects to abortion in all 
circumstances. Under the current law, the doctor would be well within his rights to 
refuse to perform the abortion. It is arguable that a doctor may see this as falling 
outside the bounds of conscientious objection, due to the risk of the mother’s death 
presumably trumping that of the foetus. Nevertheless, it is not sufficient to rely on a 
practitioner’s willingness to put aside their deeply held conscientious objection in an 
emergency. 
 
                                                            
259Henry McDonald “Ireland’s First Legal Abortion Carried Out” The Guardian (online ed, United 
Kingdom, 23 August 2013).  
260McDonald, above n 259.   
261See: RR v Poland (2011) 53 EHRR 31 (Section IV, ECHR).   
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Similarly, where the efficacy of the treatment is time dependent, the right to 
conscientiously object should also be precluded. A common example of this is where 
a patient presents to a pharmacist or doctor after unprotected intercourse requesting 
the ECP. In this situation, time is, quite literally, of the essence and the women in 
question should be immediately given the treatment regardless of the doctor or 
pharmacist in question conscientiously objecting. Any delay within this crucial period 
exposes the patient to a greater risk of an unwanted pregnancy and corresponding 
adverse mental consequences.  
 
In these circumstances, provision of the ECP should be mandatory unless there is a 
practitioner directly proximate (in essence, in the same practice) or, in the case of a 
pharmacist, at a conveniently accessible distance who will do so. Indirect referral in 
this circumstance is an inadequate substitute, as there is no guarantee that patient will 
be able to find someone to prescribe them the ECP in a timely manner, due to barriers 
such as appointment waiting times.   
 
It is important to note that information about the ECP must be provided to victims of 
sexual assault under section 5 of the CSA. This paper contends, however, that section 
5 remains insufficient insofar as it still allows medical practitioners to conscientiously 
object to providing contraceptives in these circumstances. Victims of sexual violation, 
a horrific and traumatic experience, should in no circumstances be forced to go 
through the rigmarole of finding preventative contraception themselves in the 
aftermath of an assault, in the event the medical practitioner examining them 
conscientiously objects to providing it. People in this situation are in a vulnerable 
state and this vulnerability might be compounded by other factors such as age. 
Mandatory provision of the ECP in these circumstances (aside from the current 
sensible exceptions in section 5)262 is essential to avoiding further trauma for victims 
of sexual assault.  
H  Institutions  
 
Forty four states in U.S. allow institutions to refuse to provide abortions on the basis 
of a conscientious objection protection.263 This explicit protection for institutions goes 
well beyond that which is currently protected under New Zealand law. An Official 
Information Act request revealed that all New Zealand hospitals are required to 
provide the emergency contraceptive pill and abortions, even if they object to doing 
                                                            
262Where the medical practitioner is satisfied there was no penetration or the complainant expresses a 
contrary wish see: Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion Act, s 5(1).  
263Wicclair, above n 3, at 206.  
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so.264 This raises the question of whether the approach of the United States is worth 
following.   
 
The question of whether institutions should also be permitted to conscientiously 
object to certain forms of treatment is a difficult one. It is particularly important for 
pharmacists, who often in practice are the heart and soul of their pharmacies, 
particularly sole charge ones. In this circumstance the owner’s values are difficult to 
sever from the organisation. As Henry Thoreau noted “it is truly enough said; that a 
corporation has no conscience but a corporation of conscientious men is a corporation 
with a conscience.”265 This observation was recently put to the test in the United 
States.  
 
In the United States, 60 cases have been filed seeking clarification about whether the 
mandatory provision of reproductive health in insurance, a facet of ‘Obamacare’ 
impinges on religious freedom rights.266 This paper will discuss one of these cases; 
Cornestoga v Sebelius.267 Preliminary injunctive relief was sought by Cornestoga, a 
company owned by the Hahns, a family of Mennonite Christians,268 against aspects of 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.269 This Act, to summarise mandated 
that employers with over fifty employees must provide them with “a minimum level 
of health insurance;”270 Later guidelines promulgated by the Institute of Medicine 
stated that this included reproductive health such as the ECP and contraceptives.271 
Cornestoga argued that being forced to provide this compromised their right to freely 
exercise their religion, a right they asserted was available to corporations.272  
 
The Court disagreed, stating “it would be entirely inconsistent to allow the Hahns to 
enjoy the benefits of incorporation, while simultaneously piercing the corporate veil 
for the limited purpose of challenging these regulations.”273 The Court also rejected 
the argument that the Hahns’ free exercise rights were impinged, noting that “the fact 
that one person owns all the stock does not make him and the corporation one and the 
                                                            
264Statistics Relating to Conscientious Objection and Hospitals Exercising this Right in New Zealand 
(13 August 2013) (Obtained under Official Information Act 1982 Request to the Ministry of Health). 
265Henry David Thoreau, quoted in TA Cavanaugh, above n 22, at 195.  
266 Dahlia Lithwick “All Corporations Go To Heaven” (1 August 2013) Slate <www.slate.com>. 
267 Cornestoga Wood Specialties Corporation v Sebelius 6744 F Supp 2d (ED Pa 2013). 
268At 1.  
269At 14.  
270At 11. 
271At 3. 
272At 12. 
273At 16. 
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same.”274 Other courts have, however, ruled differently and the matter seems set to go 
to the United States Supreme Court.275 
 
This paper has concluded that there should be no right of institutional conscientious 
objection. New Zealand is a vastly different political and social environment to the 
United States. In addition, the primacy of access to healthcare dictates that allowing 
an institution to refuse to provide legally available services and treatments would 
unduly affect patient welfare.  
IX Proposed Draft Clause  
 
The following recommendations have been incorporated in a draft clause, modelled 
on section 174 of the HPCA:  
 
174 Duty of health practitioners in respect of conscientious objection to providing   
health services: 
(1) This section applies whenever a health practitioner has a personal, moral, 
religious, or ethical conscientious objection to providing any health service 
(excluding advice)  
(2) When this section applies, the health practitioner must:  
(a) Inform patients, employers, and the Ministry of Health of their objection to 
providing the health service at the earliest opportunity, and;  
(b) Refer the patient to another health practitioner, whom the objecting 
practitioner believes on reasonable grounds is willing to provide the health 
service they conscientiously object to.   
(3) This section only applies to health practitioners who would be directly involved in 
the provision of the health service they object to. 
(4) This section has no application in an emergency situation or where the efficacy of 
the health service is time dependent.  
(5) This section does not allow a healthcare practitioner to refuse to provide a 
healthcare service to a patient on the basis of any of the grounds listed in section 21 
of the Human Rights Act 1993. 
(5) In any subsequent proceedings, the objecting practitioner bears the burden of 
proving the veracity of the objection.  
(6) This section has no effect on section 5 of the Contraception, Sterilisation and 
Abortion Act 1977.    
 
                                                            
274At 27.  
275For a good discussion of the conflicting case law see: Mike Appleton “The Corporate Veil Meets the 
First Communion Veil” (1 March 2013) Jonathan Turley <www.jonathanturley.org>. 
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This clause will clarify the legal status of conscientious objection in healthcare in 
New Zealand and ensure patients’ rights are not compromised by unregulated 
conscientious objection.  
X Other Options 
 
A   Patient matching  
 
Holly Fernandez Lynch has criticised the divisive “winner takes all”276 approach to 
finding a solution to conscientious objection in healthcare. Lynch advocates doctor-
patient matching based on moral viewpoints as a potential solution, which might 
eliminate the need for conscientious objection altogether.277 An advantage of Lynch’s 
proposal is that it provides an institutional solution, which might be better placed to 
solve what is a highly-charged moral conflict that law alone is not well placed to 
resolve. 278  However, the patient matching model is inherently flawed in that it 
assumes demand for disputed services would match supply, where evidence suggests 
that this is not the case.279 A recent study of 733 medical students in the United 
Kingdom found that a quarter of these students would not provide a pre-24 week 
abortion as a result of failed contraception. 280  In addition, it assumes both 
practitioners and patients will be willing to disclose their personal beliefs.281 Finally 
Lynch’s thesis does not address the fundamental question of conscientious objection; 
which is what should occur in the event of any conflict between a practitioner’s right 
to conscientiously object to providing treatment and a patient’s right to object, which 
this paper has argued should come out in favour of the patient. 
XI   Conclusion 
 
Conscientious objection, far from being a relic of the past, is a very real area of 
concern in the face of the ever-shifting medical landscape. New treatments raise new 
moral and ethical concerns, and the law has a key role in regulating this area. The 
right to conscientiously object is worth protecting; but only to the extent it does not 
impinge on a patients’ health. It may be unjust to exclude certain members of the 
                                                            
276At xi.  
277At 13.  
278Lynch, above n 33, at 1-10.   
279 Denis Campbell “Doctors Anti-Abortion Views Could Impact on Women’s Access to Service” The 
Guardian (online ed, United Kingdom, 18 July 2011).  
280Campbell, above n 279.   
281Leonard Long “Can Health Care Conscientious Objectors Thread the Needle?” (2010) 13 
Quinnipiac Health Law 51 at 82.  
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medical profession from practicing on account of their beliefs. Additionally, medical 
practitioners cannot simply become bereft of any personal sense of morality. 
Conscientious objection, however, cannot be permitted to interfere with a patient’s 
right to receive legally available treatments.  
 
Comparable jurisdictions have had the benefit of more case law to shed light on how 
contentious conscientious objection legislation has been interpreted. This case law has 
recently shifted toward a broader interpretation of the right to conscientiously object. 
Due to how recently the case was decided, it is difficult to assess the potential 
implications of the Doogan decision on staffing arrangements in hospitals, or 
women’s access to abortion. 282 In any event, the controversy indicates that it has the 
potential to be important for New Zealand to attempt to reform its conscientious 
objection legislation, to prevent disputes arising and to clarify precisely who is able to 
legally exercise the conscientious objection right, and in what circumstances.  
 
This paper has recommended a variety of possible reforms to the current legislative 
framework on abortion. Ultimately, any decisions will need to be made by the 
legislature, a body which does not seem inclined to engage with the issues 
conscientious objection raises. In the event that the legislature does engage with these 
issues, this paper has concluded that direct referral is necessary if a practitioner 
objects on grounds of conscience. This is because, in a comparatively small country 
like New Zealand, any doctor exercising their right to conscientiously object risks 
rendering the disputed service unavailable by such a refusal, a risk that is ultimately 
borne by patients, who are reliant on health practitioners to provide care.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
282Doogan, above n 40. 
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XII Appendix 
 
Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion Act 1977 
 
46 Conscientious objection: 
• (1) Notwithstanding anything in any other enactment, or any rule of law, or 
the terms of any oath or of any contract (whether of employment or 
otherwise), no medical practitioner, nurse, or other person shall be under any 
obligation— 
• (a) to perform or assist in the performance of an abortion or any 
operation undertaken or to be undertaken for the purpose of rendering 
the patient sterile: 
• (b) to fit or assist in the fitting, or supply or administer or assist in the 
supply or administering, of any contraceptive, or to offer or give any 
advice relating to contraception,— 
if he objects to doing so on grounds of conscience. 
(2) It shall be unlawful for any employer— 
• (a) to deny to any employee or prospective employee any employment, 
accommodation, goods, service, right, title, privilege, or benefit merely 
because that employee or prospective employee objects on grounds of 
conscience to do any act referred to in subsection (1); or 
• (b) to make the provision or grant to any employee or prospective 
employee of any employment, accommodation, goods, service, right, 
title, privilege, or benefit conditional upon that other person doing or 
agreeing to do any thing referred to in that subsection. 
(3) Every person who suffers any loss by reason of any act or omission rendered 
unlawful by subsection (2) shall be entitled to recover damages from the person 
responsible for the act or omission. 
(4) Nothing in this section limits or affects the provisions of section 5.  
 
Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Act 2003 
 
174 Duty of health practitioners in respect of reproductive health services 
(1) This section applies whenever— 
(a) a person requests a health practitioner to provide a service 
(including, without limitation, advice) with respect to contraception, 
sterilisation, or other reproductive health services; and 
(b) the health practitioner objects on the ground of conscience to 
providing the service. 
(2) When this section applies, the health practitioner must inform the person who 
requests the service that he or she can obtain the service from another health 
practitioner or from a family planning clinic. 
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